July 2015 – Page 2 – DoGoodSoft's Official Blog

TeslaCrypt 2.0 comes with stronger encryption and a CryptoWall disguise

TeslaCrypt, primarily known for encrypting gaming files, has beefed up its techniques and most recently, greatly improved its encryption in its newest 2.0 version.

Kasperky Lab wrote in a blog post that TeslaCrypt 2.0 not only makes it impossible to decrypt files, but also uses an HTML page copied directly from a separate ransomware: CryptoWall. And to take it a step further, TeslaCrypt no longer uses its own name; it instead opts to disguise itself as CryptoWall.

More specifically, once infected, a victim is taken to an HTML payment page directly copied from CryptoWall. It only differs in that the URLs lead to TeslaCrypt’s Tor-based servers.

Fedor Sinitsyn, senior malware analyst at Kaspersky, said in emailed comments to SCMagazine.com that he couldn’t provide an answer as to why the gaming ransomware might be using this disguise, but he speculated it’s “aimed to scare the victim and to puzzle experts trying to help the victim.”

While TeslaCrypt might not be as notorious or recognizable as CryptoWall, the ransomware’s new encryption scheme could put it higher up on IT professionals’ threat radar. Previous versions saved data in a file that could be used to recover the decryption key, Sinitsyn said. This critical data isn’t saved in the system. Backups are more imperative than ever, and Sinitsyn emphasized that they are the best defense against ransomware attacks.

“System administrators should be in charge of corporate backup and be leading the process on the corporate level,” he said. “Also, they should educate their uses on how to protect themselves from ransomware.”

TeslaCrypt mainly spreads through exploit kits, including Angler, Sweet Orange and Nuclear, and a large portion of its infections have been in the U.S.

“Ransomware as a threat is growing, criminals develop new and sophisticated pieces of malware, and in many cases decryption of the attacked files is impossible,” Sinitsyn said. “If your data is valuable, please take your time to make reliable backup copies.”

New Version of Teslacrypt changes encryption scheme

A new version of the nasty TeslaCrypt ransomware is making the rounds, and the creators have added several new features, including an improved encryption scheme and some details designed to mimic CryptoWall.
TeslaCrypt is among the more recent variants of ransomware to emerge and the malware, which is a variant of CryptoLocker, is unique in that it targets files from gaming platforms as well as other common file types. Version 2.0.0 of TeslaCrypt discovered recently by researchers at Kaspersky Lab, no longer uses a typical GUI to show users the warning about their files being encrypted. Instead, the malware opens a page in the user’s browser to display a warning message that is taken directly from CryptoWall.

That change, researchers speculated, could be a way to make TeslaCrypt seem more intimidating.

“Why use this false front? We can only guess – perhaps the attackers wanted to impress the gravity of the situation on their victims: files encrypted by CryptoWall still cannot be decrypted, which is not true of many TeslaCrypt infections,” Fedor Sinitsyn of Kaspersky Lab wrote in an analysis of the new ransomware.

But the more significant modification in version 2.0.0 is the inclusion of an updated encryption method. TeslaCrypt, like many other ransomware variants, encrypts the files on victims’ machines and demands a payment in order to obtain the decryption key. The payment typically must be in Bitcoin and the attackers using crypto ransomware have been quite successful in running their scams. Estimates of the revenue generated by variants such as CryptoLocker run into the millions of dollars per month.

Researchers have had some success in finding methods to decrypt files encrypted by ransomware, specifically TeslaCrypt. But the change to the malware’s encryption method may make that more difficult.

“The encryption scheme has been improved again and is now even more sophisticated than before. Keys are generated using the ECDH algorithm. The cybercriminals introduced it in versions 0.3.x, but in this version it seems more relevant because it serves a specific purpose, enabling the attackers to decrypt files using a ‘master key’ alone,” Sinitsyn said.

“Each file is encrypted using the AES-256-CBC algorithm with session_priv as a key. An encrypted file gets an additional extension, ‘.zzz’. A service structure is added to the beginning of the file, followed by encrypted file contents.”

The TeslaCrypt authors also took out the decryption mechanism in the malware that researchers were able to exploit in previous versions.

CHK File Recovery Has Been Updated to Version 1.08

CHK File Recovery is an excellent recovery tool specialized in recovering CHK files in a quick and easy way, which has been updated to version 1.08 recently. In this new version, we added 5 recoverable file types, and fixed the bug that the chk file cannot be recovered after manually identified.

Change Log of CHK File Recovery 1.08:

File Name: CHK File Recovery

Version: 1.08

File Size: 2.82MB

Category: CHK File Recovery Software

Language: English

License type: Trial Version

OS Support: Win2000/XP/VISTA/Win 7/Win 8

Released on: July 12, 2015

Download Address: http://www.dogoodsoft.com/chk-file-recovery/free-download.html

What’s New in This Version:

+ Added 5 recoverable file types;

– Fixed a bug that the chk file cannot be recovered after manually identified.

CHK File Recovery can accurately and quickly recover more than 120 common file types, such as mp3, mp4, jpg, bmp, gif, png, avi, rm, mov, mpg, wma, wmv, doc, docx, xls, xlsx, ppt, pptx, zip, rar, exe, dll, sql, mdb, psd.

CHK File Recovery can determine file type automatically by default. However, for file types that cannot be recognized automatically, manual judging is used to confirm file type. Manual judging can check the content of an unknown file through 4 methods and recover it afterwards.

Encryption: if this is the best his opponents can do, maybe Jim Comey has a point

“We share EPA’s commitment to ending pollution,” said a group of utility executives. “But before the government makes us stop burning coal, it needs to put forward detailed plans for a power plant that is better for the environment and just as cheap as today’s plants. We don’t think it can be done, but we’re happy to consider the government’s design – if it can come up with one.”
“We take no issue here with law enforcement’s desire to execute lawful surveillance orders when they meet the requirements of human rights and the rule of law,” said a group of private sector encryption experts, “Our strong recommendation is that anyone proposing regulations should first present concrete technical requirements, which industry, academics, and the public can analyze for technical weaknesses and for hidden costs.”
“Building an airbag that doesn’t explode on occasion is practically impossible,” declared a panel of safety researchers who work for industry. “We have no quarrel with the regulators’ goal of 100% safety. But if the government thinks that goal is achievable, it needs to present a concrete technical design for us to review. Until then, we urge that industry stick with its current, proven design.”

Which of these anti-regulation arguments is being put forward with a straight face today? Right. It’s the middle one. Troubled by the likely social costs of ubiquitous strong encryption, the FBI and other law enforcement agencies are asking industry to ensure access to communications and data when the government has a warrant. And their opponents are making arguments that would be dismissed out of hand if they were offered by any other industry facing regulation.

Behind the opponents’ demand for “concrete technical requirements” is the argument that any method of guaranteeing government access to encrypted communications should be treated as a security flaw that inevitably puts everyone’s data at risk. In principle, of course, adding a mechanism for government access introduces a risk that the mechanism will not work as intended. But it’s also true that adding a thousand lines of code to a program will greatly increase the risk of adding at least one security flaw to the program. Yet security experts do not demand that companies stop adding code to their programs. The cost to industry of freezing innovation is deemed so great that the introduction of new security flaws must be tolerated and managed with tactics such as internal code reviews, red-team testing, and bug bounties.

That same calculus should apply to the FBI’s plea for access. There are certainly social and economic costs to giving perfect communications and storage security to everyone – from the best to the worst in society. Whether those costs are so great that we should accept and manage the risks that come with government access is a legitimate topic for debate.

Unfortunately, if you want to know how great those risks are, you can’t really rely on mainstream media, which is quietly sympathetic to opponents of the FBI, or on the internet press, which doesn’t even pretend to be evenhanded on this issue. A good example is the media’s distorted history of NSA’s 1994 Clipper chip. That chip embodied the Clinton administration’s proposal for strong encryption that “escrowed” the encryption keys to allow government access with a warrant.

(Full disclosure: the Clipper chip helped to spur the Crypto War of the 1990s, in which I was a combatant on the government side. Now, like a veteran of the Great War, I am bemused and a little disconcerted to find that the outbreak of a second conflict has demoted mine to “Crypto War I.”)

The Clipper chip and its key escrow mechanism were heavily scrutinized by hostile technologists, and one, Matthew Blaze，discovered that it was possible with considerable effort to use the encryption offered by the chip while bypassing the mechanism that escrowed the key and thus guaranteed government access. Whether this flaw was a serious one can be debated. (Bypassing escrow certainly took more effort than simply downloading and using an unescrowed strong encryption program like PGP, so the flaw may have been more theoretical than real.) In any event, nothing about Matt Blaze’s paper questioned the security being offered by the chip, as his paper candidly admitted. Blaze said, “None of the methods given here permit an attacker to discover the contents of encrypted traffic or compromise the integrity of signed messages. Nothing here affects the strength of the system from the point of view of the communicating parties.” In other words, he may have found a flaw in the Clipper chip, but not in the security it provided to users.

The press has largely ignored Blaze’s caveat. It doesn’t fit the anti-FBI narrative, which is that government access always creates new security holes. I don’t think it’s an accident that no one talks these days about what Matt Blaze actually found except to say that he discovered “security flaws” in Clipper. This formulation allows the reader to (falsely) assume that Blaze’s research shows that government access always undermines security.

The success of this tactic is shown by the many journalists who have fallen prey to this false assumption. Among the reporters fooled by this line Craig Timberg of the Washington Post，“The eventually failed amid political opposition but not before Blaze … discovered that the “Clipper Chip” produced by the NSA had crucial security flaws. It turned out to be a back door that a skilled hacker could easily break through.” Also taken in was Nicole Perlroth of the New York Times: “The final blow [to Clipper]was the discovery by Matt Blaze… of a flaw in the system that would have allowed anyone with technical expertise to gain access to the key to Clipper-encrypted communications.”

To her credit, Nicole Perlroth tells me that the New York Times will issue a correction after a three-way Twitter exchange between me, her, and Matt Blaze. But the fact that the error has also cropped up in the Washington Post suggests a larger problem: Reporters are so sympathetic to one side of this debate that we simply cannot rely on them for a straight story on the security risks of government access.

PC Shutdown Timer and Schedule – Magic Timed Shutdown Updated to Version 10.03

Magic Timed Shutdown is a professional software application that powers off your computer automatically at specific times. It has four main features – timed auto shutdown, advanced computer control, computer use time limitation and startup/shutdown log analysis. In this new verison, we fixed some bugs and enhanced the software stability.

Change Log of Magic Timed Shutdown 10.03:

File Name: Magic Timed Shutdown

Version: 10.03

File Size: 5.45MB

Category: Timed Shutdown Software

Language: English

OS Support: Win2000/XP/VISTA/Win 7/Win 8

Released on: July 07, 2015

Download Address: http://www.dogoodsoft.com/magic-timed-shutdown/free-download.html

What’s New in This Version:

* Enhanced software interface for XP;

* Improved software stablility;

– Fixed the bug that the system cannot be shut down in some cases;

– Fixed several minor bugs.

PC Shutdown Timer and Schedule - Magic Timed Shutdown Updated to Version 10.03

Why Choose Magic Timed Shutdown:

Magic Timed Shutdown is an advanced and powerful tool that permits you to schedule certain tasks for your computer, such as shutdown, logoff, standby, reboot and so forth. It has four main features – Shut Down, PC Management, Time Limit and Log Analysis, which can meet all customer requirements, and especially, is a good helper for parents and computer administrators.

In The Debate Over Strong Encryption, Security And Liberty Must Win

When Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) gaveled a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing into session on Wednesday, he called it the “start” of a conversation about privacy, security and encryption. Frankly, it was just the latest forum for a much older discussion.

While it may have been the beginning of a long day on Capitol Hill for FBI Director James Comey, the national conversation about law enforcement and strong encryption has been ongoing since the 1990s and the so-called “Crypto Wars.” While the debate now has a charged geopolitical context, includes the biggest tech companies on the planet and involves smartphone encryption, it’s not a new one.

No crytographers testified at Wednesday’s hearing. If one had been present, he or she might have told the representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice Department that what they were asking Silicon Valley to develop — retaining the capacity to respond to lawful orders by providing data from computer systems with end-to-end encryption — wasn’t technically feasible in a way that didn’t fundamentally compromise the security of those systems.

If any of the 15 experts in cryptography that authored a new white paper on encryption had been called to testify, they likely would have made that case:

In the wake of the growing economic and social cost of the fundamental insecurity of today’s Internet environment, any proposals that alter the security dynamics online should be approached with caution. Exceptional access would force Internet system developers to reverse forward secrecy design practices that seek to minimize the impact on user privacy when systems are breached. The complexity of today’s Internet environment, with millions of apps and globally connected services, means that new law enforcement requirements are likely to introduce unanticipated, hard to detect security flaws. Beyond these and other technical vulnerabilities, the prospect of globally deployed exceptional access systems raises difficult problems about how such an environment would be governed and how to ensure that such systems would respect human rights and the rule of law.

The FBI and Justice Department may want the tech industry to “try harder” and give a “full, honest effort” to provide a technological way to provide access to encrypted information, but the tech industry isn’t biting.

“Proposals to mandate weakened encryption would undermine security and end user confidence in the Internet without any clear national security benefits,” said Abigail Slater, the vice president of legal and regulatory policy at the Internet Association.

“Strong encryption protects billions of global end users from countless privacy threats ranging from financial fraud to repressive governments stifling speech and democracy. Instead of forcing

companies to lower their security standards, policymakers should promote and protect the wide adoption of strong encryption technology.”

In his spoken testimony, Comey said, “There is no such thing as secure: There’s only more secure and less secure.”

Of that, there is no doubt. “Split key encryption,” where digital master keys to unlock encrypted data or systems are held in escrow, is less secure, just as it was when government officials proposed it nearly two decades ago.

The Justice Department and FBI may want to have a debate on encryption, but they’ve been dealt a losing hand at this table.

As law professor Peter Swire testified later in the Senate hearing, the review group on intelligence and communications technologies that President Barack Obama convened in August 2013 unequivocally recommended supporting strong encryption in its report on liberty and security later that year:

The US Government should take additional steps to promote security, by (1) fully supporting and not undermining efforts to create encryption standards; (2) making clear that it will not in any way subvert, undermine, weaken, or make vulnerable generally available commercial encryption; and (3) supporting efforts to encourage the greater use of encryption technology for data in transit, at rest, in the cloud, and in storage.

That conclusion is anything but isolated, as Kevin Bankston, the director of the Open Technology Institute at the New America Foundation, pointed out in an essay Tuesday:

…the broad consensus outside of the FBI is that the societal costs of such surveillance backdoors — or “front doors,” as Comey prefers to call them — far outweigh the benefits to law enforcement, and that strong encryption will ultimately prevent more crimes than it obscures.

Tech companies, privacy advocates, security experts, policy experts, all five members of President Obama’s handpicked Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, UN human rights experts, and a majority of the House of Representatives all agree: Government-mandated backdoors are a bad idea. There are countless reasonswhy this is true, including: They would unavoidably weaken the security of our digital data, devices, and communications even as we are in the midst of a cybersecurity crisis; they would cost the US tech industry billions as foreign customers — including many of the criminals Comey hopes to catch — turn to more secure alternatives; and they would encourage oppressive regimes that abuse human rights to demand backdoors of their own.

Bankston is no zealot, nor has he impugned the honor, intentions or distinguished public service record of Comey, who has notably stood on the side of civil liberties in his career.
What Bankston and many others are saying, and have been saying for years, however, is that protecting the privacy of citizens from those who would do them harm or steal from them is now intrinsically bound to encrypting devices, communications and data.

That’s true whether for cellphones, email, health records, tax transcripts or the of tens of millions of public servants.

This isn’t a competition between privacy and security or a choice between opposing value systems: it’s security and security, and on the line is the capacity of democratic societies to do investigative journalism, engage in digital commerce or securely make transactions with government.

It’s fair to acknowledge that the FBI may have a diminished capacity to conduct some investigations as a result, but in striking an appropriate balance between safety and liberty, that is sometimes the outcome.

FBI chief wants ‘backdoor access’ to encrypted communications to fight Isis

The director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has warned US senators that the threat from the Islamic State merits a “debate” about limiting commercial encryption – the linchpin of digital security – despite a growing chorus of technical experts who say that undermining encryption would prove an enormous boon for hackers, cybercriminals, foreign spies and terrorists.

In a twin pair of appearances before the Senate’s judiciary and intelligence committees on Wednesday, James Comey testified that Isis’s use of end-to-end encryption, whereby the messaging service being used to send information does not have access to the decryption keys of those who receive it, helped the group place a “devil” on the shoulders of potential recruits “saying kill, kill, kill, kill”.

Comey said that while the FBI is thus far disrupting Isis plots, “I cannot see me stopping these indefinitely”. He added: “I am not trying to scare folks.”

Since October, following Apple’s decision to bolster its mobile-device security, Comey has called for a “debate” about inserting “back doors” – or “front doors”, as he prefers to call them – into encryption software, warning that “encryption threatens to lead us all to a very, very dark place.”

But Comey and deputy attorney general Sally Quillian Yates testified that they do not at the moment envision proposing legislation to mandate surreptitious or backdoor access to law enforcement. Both said they did not wish the government to itself hold user encryption keys and preferred to “engage” communications providers for access, though technicians have stated that what Comey and Yates seek is fundamentally incompatible with end-to-end encryption.

Comey, who is not a software engineer, said his response to that was: “Really?” He framed himself as an advocate of commercial encryption to protect personal data who believed that the finest minds of Silicon Valley can invent new modes of encryption that can work for US law enforcement and intelligence agencies without inevitably introducing security flaws.

While the FBI director did not specifically cite which encrypted messaging apps Isis uses, the Guardian reported in December that its grand mufti used WhatsAppto communicate with his former mentor. WhatsApp adopted end-to-end encryption last year.

“I think we need to provide a court-ordered process for obtaining that data,” said Dianne Feinstein, the California Democrat and former intelligence committee chair who represents Silicon Valley.
But Comey’s campaign against encryption has run into a wall of opposition from digital security experts and engineers. Their response is that there is no technical way to insert a back door into security systems for governments that does not leave the door ajar for anyone – hackers, criminals, foreign intelligence services – to exploit and gain access to enormous treasure troves of user data, including medical records, financial information and much more.

The cybersecurity expert Susan Landau, writing on the prominent blog Lawfare, called Comey’s vision of a security flaw only the US government could exploit “magical thinking”.

Comey is aided in his fight against encryption by two allies, one natural and the other accidental. The natural ally is the National Security Agency director, Michael Rogers, who in February sparred with Yahoo’s chief of information security when the Yahoo official likened the anti-crypto push to “drilling a hole in the windshield”, saying: “I just believe that this is achievable. We’ll have to work our way through it.” The Guardian, thanks to Edward Snowden’s disclosures, revealed in September 2013 that the NSA already undermines encryption.

The less obvious ally is China, whom the FBI blamed last month for stealing a massive hoard of federal personnel data.

In May, China unveiled a national security law calling for “secure and controllable” technologies, something US and foreign companies fear is a prelude to a demand for backdoor entry into companies’ encryption software or outright provision of encryption keys.

Without ever mentioning his own FBI director’s and NSA director’s similar demands, Barack Obama castigated China’s anti-encryption push in March. Obama has also declined to criticize efforts in the UK, the US’s premier foreign ally, to undermine encryption. Prime minister David Cameron is proposing to introduce legislation in the autumn to force companies such as Apple, Google and Microsoft to provide access to encrypted data.

Under questioning from some skeptical senators, Comey made a number of concessions. When Ron Wyden, an Oregon Democrat, asked if foreign countries would attempt to mandate similar access, Comey replied, “I think they might.” The director acknowledged that foreign companies, exempt from any hypothetical US mandate, would be free to market encryption software.
In advance of Comey’s testimony, several of the world’s leading cryptographers, alarmed by the return of a battle they thought won during the 1990s “Crypto Wars”, rejected the effort as pernicious from a security perspective and technologically illiterate.

A paper they released on Tuesday, called “Keys Under Doormats”, said the transatlantic effort to insert backdoors into encryption was “unworkable in practice, raise[s] enormous legal and ethical questions, and would undo progress on security at a time when internet vulnerabilities are causing extreme economic harm”.

Asked by Feinstein if the experts had a point, Comey said: “Maybe. If that’s the case, I guess we’re stuck.”

Kevin Bankston of the New America Foundation called into question the necessity of Comey’s warnings that encryption would lead to law enforcement “going dark” against threats. Bankston, in a Tuesday blogpost, noted that the government’s latest wiretap disclosure found that state and federal governments could not access four encrypted conversations out of 3,554 wiretapped in 2014.

Yet Yates said both that the Justice Department was “increasingly” facing the encryption challenge and that she lacked the data quantifying how serious the challenge was. Yates told the Senate judiciary committee that law enforcement declined to seek warrants in cases of encrypted communications and did not say how often it made such a decision.

OpenSSL to Patch Critical Mystery Bug on Thursday

The OpenSSL project team has sent a rather cryptic alert that it will be patching a high severity bug this Thursday, July 9.

The announcement is terse: “The OpenSSL project team would like to announce the forthcoming release of OpenSSL versions 1.0.2d and 1.0.1p. These releases will be made available on 9th July. They will fix a single security defect classified as “high” severity. This defect does not affect the 1.0.0 or 0.9.8 releases.”

Unfortunately, the mystery bug is likely to be a big deal. OpenSSL is a security standard encrypting communications between users and the servers provided by a majority of online services. As such, it’s a basic component of a wide swath of the web, affecting various applications and systems, and even embedded devices. That’s one of the reasons why the Heartbleed flaw took months and months to patch even after an update was released.

Heartbleed, a mistake written into OpenSSL, made it viable for hackers to extract data from massive databases containing user names, passwords, private data and so on.

According to OpenSSL’s security policy, “high-severity” flaws are those that affect common configurations and are likely to be exploitable. These can range from server denial-of-service to significant leak of server memory to remote code execution.

“This type of a pre-announcement is intended to give organizations a chance to prepare,” Tim Erlin, director of IT security and risk strategy at Tripwire, said via email. “A huge part of the heartburn with Heartbleed came from the scramble to identify where organizations were vulnerable and how to apply patches. In this case, a little organization can go a long way to a smoother patching cycle. Software vendors who use OpenSSL can be prepared to patch their code and ship new versions faster, and end-users can inventory where they have OpenSSL and set up appropriate testing environments ahead of time.”

FBI director James Comey calls for ‘robust debate’ to limit digital encryption to combat terror groups

FBI director James Comey has called for public debate on the use of encrypted communications, claiming Americans may not realise how radical groups and criminals are using the technology.

Mr Comey’s comments in a blog post appeared to seek further public support for his view — first expressed last year — that improved encryption being developed for digital devices could hinder the efforts of US law enforcement and intelligence operations.

While the FBI chief’s comments sparked criticism in the tech community and among civil liberties activists, Mr Comey said US citizens may not realise how Islamic State (IS) militants used encryption to avoid detection.

“When the government’s ability… to see an individual’s stuff goes away, it will affect public safety,” he wrote on the Lawfare blog. “That tension is vividly illustrated by the current ISIL threat, which involves ISIL operators in Syria recruiting and tasking dozens of troubled Americans to kill people,” he wrote using another acronym to refer to the militant group.

“It is a process that increasingly takes part through mobile messaging apps that are end-to-end encrypted, communications that may not be intercepted, despite judicial orders under the Fourth Amendment.”

He added that criminal probes may also be affected because “there is simply no doubt that bad people can communicate with impunity in a world of universal strong encryption”.

The FBI chief and other US officials began expressing concern last year after Google and Apple announced plans to lock communications, leaving keys only in users’ hands, in a way that would prevent access by law enforcement even with a warrant.

Those moves came after an outcry over revelations from former intelligence contractor Edward Snowden exposing vast electronic surveillance programs by the US and its allies.

Mr Comey said in his blog post that “the logic of encryption will bring us, in the not too distant future, to a place where devices and data in motion are protected by universal strong encryption… in such a way that permits access only by participants to a conversation or the owner of the device holding the data”.

He noted that “there are many benefits” to encryption, saying it can protect “our innovation, our private thoughts, and so many other things of value, from thieves of all kinds”. But he added that the public should consider the trade-offs of allowing access to the government under certain conditions.

“Democracies resolve such tensions through robust debate,” Mr Comey said. “It may be that, as a people, we decide the benefits here outweigh the costs and that there is no sensible, technically feasible way to optimise privacy and safety in this particular context.”

“Those are decisions Americans should make, but I think part of my job is make sure the debate is informed by a reasonable understanding of the costs.”

Folder Encryption Software – Ace Secret Folder Has Been Updated to Version 6.66

Ace Secret Folder, a professional folder encyption software, has been updated to version 6.66 recently. In this new version, we have made great improvements, such as fixed some major and minor bugs. Besides, we enhanced the password hint, the encryption efficiency and strength, and the user interface.

Change Log of Ace Secret Folder 6.66:

File Name: Ace Secret Folder

Version: 6.66

File Size: 2.96MB

Language: English

License: Trial Version

OS Support: Win2000/XP/VISTA/Win 7/Win 8

Released on: Jun.26, 2015

Download Address: http://www.dogoodsoft.com/ace-secret-folder/free-download.html

What’s New in This Version:

– Fixed bug unable to change the software skin promptly;

– Fixed bug that software ID exception in specific systems;

– Fixed 5 minor bugs;

* Improved password hint;

* Improved efficiency and strength for Password Protection and Hiding Protection;

* Enhanced software interface for XP.

Why Choose Ace Secret Folder:

Ace Secret Folder is a folder encryption application that makes your folder “secret” and invisible, providing a strong shield to protect your important documents and privacy. It has four main features.

(1) Invisible and without any trace after installation

Ace Secret Folder becomes unseen and without any trace after installation; no one can perceive its existence.

(2) Simple Hotkey Invocation

After Ace Secret Folder is installed, use the shortcut key “Ctrl +Alt + H” to quickly invoke the folder encryption software, so as to encrypt or decrypt a folder. You can set your own software hotkey to hide your secret even deeper.

(3) Folders disappear after encryption

A folder encrypted with Ace Secret Folder becomes completely invisible and disappears from your computer. It can only be opened or decrypted with this folder encryption software.

(4) Fast encryption and decryption

All encryption and decryption in Ace Secret Folder are done in just seconds regardless of the number and size of folders.